Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto's visit to China was initially touted as a success as it culminated with a joint statement that laid out closer collaboration between the two nations, securing much needed investment for Indonesia. However, the agreement over the disputed maritime zone in the South China Sea has come under criticism domestically, potentially serving as the administration's first big foreign policy blunder.
Only a month after assuming the presidency of the largest maritime nation in the world, President Prabowo Subianto has gotten his foreign policy footprint started on a high note. Having spent 17 of his first 100 days in office abroad, Prabowo secured a combined 18 billion US dollars’ worth of investment from his first international visits to 6 Indonesia’s strategic and almost-strategic partners including, and especially, the United States and China. Of these visits, Beijing is where Prabowo managed to gain the most. However, his presidential visit to the capital of China is not without criticism, and in fairness, could also be the site of his first diplomatic blunder.
Coming out from Prabowo’s visit to China was the news that Indonesia has implicitly recognized China’s longstanding nine-dash line in exchange for economic concessions. As laid out in the Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia on Advancing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership earlier this November, the two countries have explicitly expressed willingness to advance cooperation in the boldly stated ‘overlapping claim’ through a joint development program. Although, as quoted in the MOFA press release, the basis of such cooperation is mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity, it undermines the legal consequence should another maritime conflict erupt between the two countries. Moreover, basing the agreement as a venue for promoting ‘higher political trust’ is a blatant naivety. The precedents spoke volumes against this, given the almost regular invasions of Chinese fishing vessels in the North Natuna Island in the past decade where former President Joko Widodo himself had to flex his executive order and have the Indonesian Coast Guard sink the captured vessels.
Indonesia’s geospatial expert on the law of the sea I Made Andi Arsana asserted in length that there is no such thing as an overlapping claim. First, the North Natuna Sea which was expansively claimed as a part of China’s Nine-Dash Lines falls within Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and is inalienably Indonesia’s territorial water. Second, the basis of joint development zones is null and void. Provisional arrangement of joint development areas is only feasible in case of overlapping maritime boundaries. In contrast, both Indonesia’s and China’s ocean territories are distantly underlapped, and therefore under no circumstances should the two countries have joint development areas. Thirdly, despite not being a direct claimant in the South China Sea conflict, Indonesia’s longstanding position had always been to negate the presence of the nine-dash lines. Hence, as ANU’s PhD Scholar, Aristyo Darmawan puts it, the new administration has betrayed its pursuit of territorial integrity and extensively damaged its proactive claim of regional leadership in ASEAN.
Despite being divided on various trans-regional dynamics, ASEAN member-states, particularly the maritime powers such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are not fractured on the South China Sea issue given their shared interest to drive China away from claiming their territorial waters and continental shelves. The striking question then is if Indonesia is being taken for a ride or is Indonesia testing China? Is it worth the risk? It is worth noting that UNLOS is not being referenced in the document despite both sides ratifying the convention. This means that there will be a large level uncertainty in the outcome of this agreement. This could unveil the good, the bad, and the ugly sides of international law enforcement in ASEAN’s equation where Southeast Asian countries are involved in constant shifting depending on the state of their interest. This was called ‘the fifty shades of hedging’ by a renowned Filipino scholar, Richard Heydarian to explain the diverse ways in which ASEAN states navigate their geopolitical realities vis a vis the United States and China. Therefore, I argue that Indonesia must remain in the same gear against China on the issue not only to stand its ground firmer domestically but also to keep ASEAN uniformed and unshaken amidst geopolitical turbulence in the Indian Ocean.
Indonesia’s rapid shift has multiple consequences for intra-ASEAN cohesion. First, by recognizing the nine-dash line, it exposed the ununified stance of ASEAN member states vis-a-vis China. Almost recently, Indonesia and Vietnam have concluded a 12-year-long negotiation on the delimitation of their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that put their territorial disagreement to rest. However, recent Indonesia’s manoeuvres could inflict major distrust among ASEAN claimants, particularly Vietnam and later the Philippines. As the Philippines' unilateral effort to secure its stake in the Scarborough Shoal was successful before the ICJ Tribunal Arbitration, ASEAN’s contribution was nearly absent, and this could distance the Philippines further away from Jakarta. Furthermore, conceding territorial water to China would immediately soften Indonesia’s future approach to another potential invasive movement in the North Natuna area. Nearly two weeks before Prabowo visited Beijing, the Indonesian Coast Guard escorted a Chinese vessel from its territory although through a rather softer tone. This tit-for-tat strategy is harmful to ASEAN, and could undermine the very objective of ASEAN Outlook in the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) initiated by Jakarta whereby Southeast Asian nations play a greater role in ensuring a peaceful and rule-based Indo-Pacific.
In summary, the recent joint statement could be a severe loss to Indonesia. Nevertheless, observers and scholars are divided. Massive criticisms were addressed under the premise of non-negotiability for territorial integrity. Others sanctioned the growing scepticism in place of signalling strategic clarity within the geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether Jakarta will enforce a follow-up preventive measure while Beijing remains ready to materialize the gains from the joint statement immediately. At a personal level, I assume that the current stance is still beyond conclusive from Prabowo’s end. As a former defence minister and an acclaimed ‘foreign policy president’, losing territorial authority under his watch is the last thing he wants to see.
Eventually, having an outward-looking government after a decade of highly transactional and economic-focused diplomacy, Indonesia will be seeking to revamp the posture of its ‘free and active’ foreign policy in both regional and global stages. Due to this, it is equally important for Indonesia to remain strong on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Additionally, as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, Indonesia needs a quick fix to retain its presumptive leadership in ASEAN. Besides clarifying its stance with Beijing on maritime claims bilaterally Jakarta needs to take a larger ownership of ASEAN interoperability in key issues including the South China Sea conflict and region-wide forced migration from Myanmar. Going forward, Indonesia needs to play its card right to restore trust to Jakarta with Beijing having a stake on both issues which becomes a litmus test to ASEAN.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.
Author
Satria Rizaldi Alchatib is a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. His research focuses on ASEAN and regional security in Indo-Pacific.