As the world continues to grapple with the impact of identity politics on the socio-political fabric of societies, there is a growing concern that the continued influence of identity politics will only serve to hasten the democratic recession faced by many of the developed democracies around the world. Perhaps these struggling nations can look to Taiwan for a lesson in how to handle identity cleavages while still slowly develop and strengthen democratic institutions.
News from around the world recently brings stories of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, a culture war in the United States, and sectarian violence among parts of the Indian diaspora in Canada. It seems as though almost all Western democracies are experiencing intense debates about national identity and how diverse groups fit into each respective society. Taiwan is also working through a number of complicated questions about its national identity, yet its democracy is regarded as a clear success, going from strength to strength. Taiwan is therefore an interesting case to examine regarding the interaction of political culture, identity politics and democracy. Fukuyama argues that identity politics is motivated by demands for recognition and dignity, using the Ancient Greek word thymos, meaning ‘spirit’. The ideal liberal democracy can mediate these demands for recognition which are central to people’s self-conception and sense of self-worth. Identity politics has become more important in developed democracies in the twenty-first century, but it has essentially been the central issue in Taiwanese politics even before democratisation.
Identity was and still is the primary cleavage in Taiwanese politics. Today, an increasing proportion of the population regard themselves solely as Taiwanese. But Taiwanese democratisation and identity politics are tied together in much deeper ways. The process of democratisation gave opportunities for other sub-ethnic groups to be recognised, and to have their language and history valued and included in the emerging national identity. Since the 1990s, Taiwanese society has generally seen itself as composed of four main ethnic groups- these being Hoklo (descendents of Hokkien speakers from Fujian province), Hakka (a distinct but often marginalised Chinese ethno-linguistic group), waishengren(the descendants of mainland Chinese who came over with the KMT at the end of the Chinese Civil War), and aboriginal peoples. Wang notes that Hakka communities saw the extension of recognition to their group as the chance to be co-masters of a newly democratised Taiwan, rather than being marginalised by either waishengren or Hoklo. It is worth considering what these concurrent journeys towards democracy and identity imply for today’s democracies, where changing identity goes hand in glove with declining confidence in the importance of democracy in many citizens’ lives. Taiwan’s experiences should invite two questions. First, given that Taiwan’s success was tied up with the process of becoming a democracy and overcoming the cultural policy of authoritarianism, can a similar process work in a society which is already democratic? Second, can a democratic nationalism make space for new groups that are not already an accepted part of that conceptual nationalism?
One should also note that Taiwanese attitudes to their national identity are continually in motion. Since democratisation in the 1990s, Taiwanese society has continued to evolve. Although Taiwan’s indigenous peoples were included in the four ethnic groups, the question over how to include them in an emerging Taiwanese identity has only become more salient since the 1990s. Indigenous issues have become more important in three respects. First, a growing number of Hoklo Taiwanese have rediscovered their own distant heritage, often obscured because of discrimination against their indigenous ancestors or deep assimilation. Second, as a political project, Taiwanese independence activists have embraced indigenous identity as a way of distancing Taiwan’s national identity from a Sino-centric origin. Thirdly, similar to global movements centred on indigenous rights and activism, there is a small but vocal demand for greater redress and justice for indigenous communities, including the return of traditional lands or a vaguely defined decolonisation of Taiwan. Ironically, the language of decolonisation had previously been used by Taiwanese activists against KMT rule, framing the waishengren as a foreign colonial force that ruled over and repressed ‘native’ Taiwanese. The way in which indigenous activists have now turned this language on Hoklo Taiwanese, who after all came over and dominated Taiwan before the KMT even existed, will be an interesting trend to watch over the coming years.
Alongside the developing indigenous consciousness, there are now many more Taiwanese who are descended from recent, non-Han immigrants, either fully or in part. It is increasingly common for children born in Taiwan to have one parent from South East Asia, in particular Vietnam. While still comparatively small compared to the West, the proportion of immigrants making their homes in Taiwan is noticeably growing. Attitudes towards immigrant families vary among both members of the public and government institutions. New figures from the Taiwanese government show the smallest number of new births on record in 2024, and Taiwan’s population continues to age and decline. One would expect that pressure to welcome more immigrants to sustain the working population will grow in light of these dramatic projections, making the place of immigrants in Taiwanese identity more important in the future.
What lessons can be learned? Democratisation in Taiwan was complemented by the simultaneous development of its emerging national identity. Especially important was how previously marginalised groups were carried along on the tides of democracy, ‘earning’ a stake in the new democratic nation. In Taiwan, this democratic nationhood was founded on groups already there at the time of democratisation, mainlanders, Han Taiwanese, and indigenous peoples. It is unclear how well Taiwan will navigate maintaining its democratic institutions and national identity as the balance of demographic power between these groups changes. This could affect Taiwanese identity through a moral re-evaluation of Taiwan’s history, or the arrival of new groups of people who cannot easily fit into the pre-existing moulds that formed during the process of democratisation.
In the wider democratic world, many countries are struggling with this very issue of incorporating new or growing demographic groups into their national identity, while at the same time suffering a loss of institutional confidence on the part of majority ethnic groups. Taiwan’s democratisation journey shows the power of democracy to pull together historical rivals in a way that recognises distinct identities but encourages them to ‘buy in’ to a common national project. Democracy is rooted in the sovereignty of ordinary citizens to determine their own futures. Democracies are stronger when all citizens see their fate as tied to one another and the success and prosperity of the nation as a whole. Continued democratic success in Taiwan, and democratic renewal across the rest of the democratic world, will depend on being able to replicate this process of buying in, recognising distinctions, and understanding a shared national life and destiny.
Conversely, failing to bring a section of a country’s ethnic makeup into the democratic consensus can undermine social trust and social cohesion. Taiwan’s success was predicated on collecting all the extant groups and making space for them. Leaving other minority groups out could have encouraged those groups to regard democracy as a Hoklo supremacist project or a cynical power play by waishengren to secure their dominant position, but offering a stake for Hakka and protection for indigenous peoples defused historic tensions and also serves as the foundation for today’s notion of democratic citizenship and civic nationalism. As in mature democracies, Taiwan will need to ensure that its democratic institutions and its sense of civic identity are able to incorporate new and rising groups, in order to continue its remarkable success in consolidating its democracy.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.
Author
Eliot Gibbins holds a PhD in Asia-Pacific Studies from National Chengchi University in Taiwan, where he wrote a dissertation on democratic deconsolidation in four Asia-Pacific countries. He also previously completed a Masters in International Relations and Diplomacy and a Bachelor of Arts majoring in Political Science from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. He now lives in Wellington.